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Abstract: Scandals in auditing have deteriorated the credibility of the accounting 
profession. The low law enforcement and concentrated ownership structure in 
Indonesia (La Porta et al., 1999; Siregar, 2006) has led to lower auditor 
independence. This study uses social cognitive theory in modeling. Based on social 
cognitive theory, law enforcement influences auditor’s concern to professional 
sanction. Then, the concern to professional sanction is cognitive which influence 
auditor's independence. The objectives of this research are to examine the effect of 
work context to the level of auditor’s concern to professional sanction, the role of 
auditor’s concern to professional sanction to his or her professionalism and 
independence. Based on scenario-based surveys in Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, 
Denpasar, Yogyakarta, we received 186 usable questionnaires (83 questionnaires 
from auditors working in non-big four accounting firms and 103 questionnaires from 
auditors who work in big four firms). This study uses multiple regression analysis and 
independent sample test. This study found that work context did not influence the level 
of auditor's concern to professional sanction but auditor's concern to professional 
sanction influences his or her independence to the audited. Finally, this research 
provides evidence that professionalism and concern to professional sanction have 
substitution effect to auditor’s independence. 
Keywords: Concern to Professional Sanction, Auditor’s Independence, Work Context, 
Social Cognitive Theory 
 
Intisari: Skandal dalam audit telah memburuk kredibilitas profesi akuntansi. 
Rendahnya penegakan hukum dan struktur kepemilikan yang terkonsentrasi di 
Indonesia (La Porta et al, 1999; Siregar, 2006) telah menyebabkan independensi 
auditor yang lebih rendah. Penelitian ini menggunakan teori kognitif sosial dalam 
pemodelan. Berdasarkan teori kognitif sosial, penegakan hukum mempengaruhi 
kepedulian auditor terhadap sanksi profesional. Kemudian, perhatian terhadap sanksi 
profesional adalah kognitif yang memengaruhi independensi auditor. Tujuan dari 
penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji pengaruh konteks kerja terhadap tingkat 




perhatian auditor terhadap sanksi profesional, peran perhatian auditor terhadap 
sanksi profesional terhadap profesionalisme dan kemandiriannya. Berdasarkan survei 
berbasis skenario di Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, Denpasar, Yogyakarta, kami 
menerima 186 kuesioner yang memenuhi syarat (83 kuesioner dari auditor yang 
bekerja di kantor akuntan non big 4 dan 103 kuesioner dari auditor yang bekerja di 4 
perusahaan besar). Penelitian ini menggunakan analisis regresi berganda dan uji 
sampel independen. Studi ini menemukan bahwa konteks kerja tidak mempengaruhi 
tingkat perhatian auditor terhadap sanksi profesional, tetapi perhatian auditor 
terhadap sanksi profesional mempengaruhi independensinya terhadap auditor yang 
diaudit. Akhirnya, penelitian ini memberikan bukti bahwa profesionalisme dan 
perhatian terhadap sanksi profesional memiliki efek substitusi terhadap independensi 
auditor. 
Kata Kunci: Kekhawatiran terhadap Sanksi Profesional, Independensi Auditor, 




The emerging scandals between an auditor and their audited clients cause the 
decrease of public trust towards the auditor's professionalism. The scandals are 
unavoidable due to the auditor's position, cause oneself unable to act professionally. In 
the guideline of National Committee of Governance (KNKG, 2006) was said that the 
chosen auditor was appointed by RUPS (General Meeting of the Shareholders) 
through the Board of Commissioners. In reality, it was found many RUPS gave their 
authority to the Board of Directors. In such condition, the Board of Directors has a 
more powerful position to control the audit of a financial statement of companies. In 
the auditor’s position, business continuity is also considered when they accept the 
auditing assignment. This may cause the auditor unable to be professional, hence, in 
ones’ turn, can’t act independently. Enron case shows evidence that auditor is helpless 
against the audited when the audited can give a significant income for him (Zeff, 
2003). 
Incidences of audit scandals cause reactions from IAI (Institute of Indonesia 
Chartered Accountants), IAPI (Indonesian Public Accountant Institute) and the 
government to manage the work of accountants and auditor. To increase auditor’s 
professionalism, IAI and IAPI had made a policy to regulate the process of 
accountancy education in Indonesia (Akuntan Indonesia, 2012: 8). This policy was 
Francisca Reni Retno Anggraini, et all.. 
239 
 
done to increase the knowledge and skills of an auditor. Other than that, the 
Indonesian government has ratified UU Number 5 the Year 2011 about Public 
Accountant and Government Ordinance Number 84 the year 2012 about Public 
Accountant Profession Committee. One of the job desks of Public Accountant 
Profession Committee is to give considerations towards the empowerment, coaching 
and supervision policy of public accountant and KAP. This was intended to increase 
the quality of the financial report, sound system, and tax necessities. 
IAI dan IAPI policy and ratification of two rules above was expected to increase 
the quality of auditor work and at last, will increase public trust towards Indonesian 
capital market. On the other hand, those two rules increase the risk for auditor in doing 
his job. This may cause anxiety for an auditor that he might get professional sanction 
when they are wrong in giving audit opinion. Auditor’s worries of getting professional 
sanction enable an auditor to be careful in giving opinions. This will increase auditor’s 
independence. In consequence, worries of getting professional sanction are not only 
affected by whether there is or there is no regulation that controls, but also whether 
those rules are made well or not. 
This experiment aims to test whether getting professional sanction has a 
significant role in the increase of auditor’s performance.  This experiment is based on 
the theory of social cognitive theory. The social cognitive theory states that in making 
an individual decision there are three elements correlated to each other, they are 
behavior, cognitive and environment. The cognitive development of a person is 
significantly affected by the environment where that person is making a decision. 
Anggraini et al. (2013) found that auditor’s professional development is affected by 
the auditor’s workplace. This means that the work environment affects cognitive, by 
the professionalism showed. Other than that, work environment also affects behavior, 
which is indicated by independence. This experiment identifies the law environment 
as a factor that was suspected to affect cognitive development and someone’s' 
behavior. According to social cognitive theory, the worries of getting professional 
sanction is a result of a cognitive process that was formed from individual experience 
in perceiving the law environment. Auditor’s experience in law environment will 




inflict perception and appraisal to the risk of struck by professional sanction. This will 
create a level of anxiety of being incurred by professional sanction.   
This experiment shows empirical evidence that first; there is no anxiety difference 
against being incurred by professional sanction between auditors that work in KAP big 
4 or non-big 4. Secondly, there is an influence of worries getting professional sanction 
on auditor’s independence. This supports the cognitive, social theory that cognitive 
impacts behavior. Thirdly, there’s an anxiety moderation effect of getting professional 
sanction on relationships between professionalism and auditor’s independence. 
However, this moderation effect is in contrary to the hypothesis because moderation’s 
effect characteristic is negative. This means that professionalism and anxiety of 
getting professional sanction substitutes in enhancing the independence of the auditor. 
If the auditor is less professional but has a high professional sanction level of concern, 
then independence will be high. 
The results of this study are expected to contribute to the government and the 
Public Accounting Profession Committee on the role of law enforcement (law 
enforcement) in improving the performance of auditors and ultimately the quality of 
financial statements. The results of this study are expected to provide evidence for the 
implementation role of the rules that are effective in changing the behavior of auditors 
towards the better.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Social Cognitive Theory 
Social cognitive theory introduced by Bandura in 1986 is the development of 
social learning theory (social learning theory) which was also written by him in 1977 
(Bandura, 2001). According to social cognitive theory, three aspects affect each other 
in the decision-making process of individuals, namely cognitive (and other personal 
factors), environment, and behavior. Independent behavior of the auditor is a 
manifestation of the cognitive processes that auditors in information processing. This 
information not only from experience itself but also involves the social context of the 
auditor's interaction and experience with others in the past. Information derived from 
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the social context and the experience of others is called social information (Salancik 
and Pfeffer, 1978). Processing of social information related to learning that someone 
has done during his interaction in a given environment. Pop-up of the processing of 
this information will be used to form the self-regulation system will further establish 
themselves. Pop-up of social information processing is done in interaction with the 
environment in which he works will appear on the behavior exhibited by the 
individual. According to Bandura (2001), self-regulation dealing with the capacity to 
coordinate the process of cognitive, affective and behavioral to achieve established 
goals. This self-regulation would form self-efficacy that can be used as a guideline for 
a person to be able to act upon the target set. Concerns of a professional auditor's 
being sanctioned pop-ups from cognitive processes in the face of the risk of getting 
professional sanctions. The level of concern will depend on his own experience or the 
experience of others when they are wrong in giving opinions. Concerns of sanctioned 
professional auditor will affect the behavior shown by the independence of the auditor 
to be audited. Law characteristics and its implementation will also affect the 
performance of auditors. Cross-country research shows that the big four auditors from 
accounting firm do not necessarily indicate that audit quality is better than the non-big 
four accounting firm (Favere-Marches, 2000; Khurara and Raman, 2004; Francis and 
Wang, 2008; and Michas, 2011). These studies show that the level of investor 
protection will affect the behavior of auditors. Francis and Wang (2008) found that the 
level of investor protection in a country has a strong influence on the performance of 
KAP big 4. KAP big four operating in countries with weak investor protection level 
indicate that audit quality is not better than non-big KAP 4. Weak investor protection 
level causes audited dare to suppress auditor to fulfill her desire (Fan and Wong, 
2005). 
On the other hand, the auditor is also afraid to act independently because of the 
risk of low litigation he faces (Francis et al., 2002; Francis and Wang, 2008). Auditor 
in Indonesia may also tend not to act independently because, according to La Porta et 
al., (2006), Indonesia is among countries with the characteristics of a weak level of 
investor protection. On the other hand, companies in Indonesia have the characteristics 




of concentrated ownership (Siregar, 2006). Concentrated ownership resulted in the 
expropriation of the majority shareholder on a minority shareholder. The dominance 
of the majority shareholder in the company is also demonstrated by the lack of a clear 
separation between the manager and majority shareholder since the majority 
shareholders also held the manager. In the company whose ownership is concentrated 
in families, managers or directors and commissioners are not independent are 
generally derived or still have family ties with the majority shareholder. In these 
conditions, any independent commissioner may also not work optimally because of 
the dominance of the majority shareholders is very strong. Even based on a search of 
the general meeting of shareholders (AGM), the authors found that the AGM on 
several companies has delegated the authority to the directors to appoint, suspend and 
provide compensation to the auditors who audited the financial statements of the 
company. In these situations, the auditor will have a fragile position when auditing the 
company so that the auditor can not act independently and ultimately opinions given 
are not objective. 
Based on a psychological perspective, the legal environment will affect the 
assessment of a person to the risk of sanctions. Clarkson et al. (2002) say that when a 
person sees the adverse effects of the action, then he will be careful in doing the same 
action in the future. This means a negative impact of an action taken will reduce 
cognitive biases that occur in the processing of information by the auditor. The higher 
the risk, the higher the professional sanction and the concerns. These concerns will 
further increase the independence of the auditor. 
 
2.2 Concerns of getting Professional Sanctions 
Any professional organizations have rules and standards to regulate the conduct 
and work of its members. Likewise, the auditor in the audit performance must comply 
with the norms and standards established by the organization auditing public 
accounting profession (in Indonesia is IAPI) and the rules and norms applied in which 
he worked. The Indonesian government has also approved Law (UU) No. 5/2011 
about Public Accountant.UU Is expected to make the highest legal basis to regulate 
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and protect the profession of private auditors and is expected to boost confidence in 
the Indonesian audit profession, which in turn will develop the Indonesian capital 
market. 
If the valid rules can be run, the auditor who violates the rules will be sanctioned 
either by a professional organization or government. According to Law No. 5 of 2011, 
the threat of punishment that can be imposed on a public accountant or auditor is not 
limited to the imposition of sanctions by the temporary suspension or revocation of a 
license to practice, but the government also has the authority to impose criminal 
threats to the auditor who severely violate professional ethics. 
Melumad and Thoman (1990) found that the threat of litigation allows the auditor 
decides to work and make their reports correctly about his findings to reduce the 
prospect of future losses. High threat of litigation caused the auditor to seek a way to 
reduce this risk by improving the quality and audit planning, and audit costs increase, 
more often issued opinions with modifications and more selective in choosing clients 
(Khrishnan and Khrishnan, 1997). Farmer et al. (1987) found that the threat of 
litigation resulted in the auditor to be more cautious in examining the financial 
statements. 
An environment with a high threat of litigation resulted in auditors to be more 
ethical than the environment with a lower threat of litigation. Countries that have a 
code of professional conduct will either show the auditor have higher sensitivity levels 
to ethical dilemmas (Douglas et al., 2001; Dreike and Moeckel, 1995; Claypool et al., 
1990 cited by Jones et al., 2003). The existence of a code of conduct made ethical 
ambiguity reduced and will assist the auditor in recognizing the ethical issues and help 
distinguish actions that are ethical and unethical. Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) 
suggest that the risk of litigation is an essential factor to be considered in providing the 
auditor's opinion on the financial statements of his client. 
The critical role of regulation in enhancing the auditor's independence depends on 
how strong the law enforcement that runs in a country. Effective law enforcement will 
cause concern to the auditor about the possibility that he would be exposed to 
litigation if he does not perform audits properly. According to social cognitive theory, 




a person will behave as others do when the behavior of others that provide benefits 
(give positive impact) and will not do what others do when their actions cause harm 
(to give negative impact). Therefore, when a lot of other auditors who gets punished 
for his mistake in giving specific audit opinion the auditor will be cautious in carrying 
out his duties. 
In this study, concerns about litigation are defined as the perception of the auditor 
regarding the possible risks he would receive when he does not perform audits 
following auditing standards and regulations. This study uses two items of questions 
to measure this construct, the first related to whether the applicable rules will be taken 
into consideration for the audit process to be done and second, whether the auditor's 
experience earlier that violate rules and sanctions will make him more careful in 
carrying out his work  
 
2.3 Concerns of getting Professional Sanctions and Employment Context 
According to social cognitive theory, the environment will affect the formation of 
a person's cognitive. Results of research Anggraini et al. (2013) showed that the effect 
on the employment professionalism context and auditor’s independence. Auditors 
working in KAP big 4 have lower professionalism and independence than the non-big 
KAP 4. The results of this study support the idea Gendron et al. (2006) and Suddaby et 
al. (2009). The results of the above studies are in alignment with the arguments of the 
social cognitive theory that the environment will affect the cognitive and behavior. 
According to social cognitive theory, personal experience and others will affect the 
formation of self-efficacy. This self-efficacy will affect self-regulation. Lower 
professionalism and independence in big four auditor at KAP compared to an auditor 
in non-big four can be caused due to the big 4’s are bolder to face professional 
sanctions risk compared with non-big four auditor at KAP. This is because the auditor 
at KAP big four may perceive he would not be sanctioned because KAP big four 
professional has a higher power to avoid those sanctions. Research conducted by 
Francis et al. (2002), Khurara and Raman (2004), Francis and Wang (2008), and 
Michas (2011) showed that the level of protection of investors in one country affects 
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the performance of auditor at KAP big 4. Jeong and Rho (2004), using sample 
companies in Korea, found that the quality of audit (the proxy for discretionary 
accruals) between KAP big 4 and non-big 4 is no different. Hwang and Chang (2010) 
found that the litigation environment has a significant influence on the auditor's 
decision.  
Indonesia is among countries with a weak level of investor protection and also has 
the characteristics of weak law enforcement as well (La Porta et al., 2006). Besides, 
Moore et al. (2006) also say that the group with more power can influence the 
regulator in making the rules. In Indonesia, the professional organizations that exist, 
primarily dominated by people or groups who have a strong influence because they 
can fund the activities carried out by the professional organizations. The same thing 
happens in IICPA, members of organizations that have strong influence auditors are 
derived from all big KAPs, including big 4. It can be understood as the KAP big 4 
have the number of auditors and have a lot of financial resources. With the political 
power of the firm where the auditors work, might cause auditors to be more daring not 
to obey the rules. When the auditor perceived that the firm where he works could 
protect themselves from the imposition of sanctions as a result of negligence in 
carrying out the audits properly, then professional sanction concerns will be low. 
Auditor with the big four would likely have greater confidence that he was able to 
avoid sanctions, so the professional sanctions concerns will also be low. 
Therefore, the working context alleged the effect on the magnitude of professional 
sanction concerns when auditors do not carry out audits following the standard. 
Auditor with the big four would feel more courageous to face this risk compared 
auditors working in KAP non-big four because they think has a greater ability to 
resolve ethical dilemmas faced. Thus, fears of an auditor at KAP non-big four 
professional sanctions greater than the auditor at KAP big 4. Therefore, the alternative 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
 
H1. Auditors working in KAP the big four have lower professional sanction concerns 
than the auditors working in non-big four accounting firm.  




2.4 Concerns of getting Professional Sanctions, professionalism, and independence of 
the Auditor 
Research on audit quality between KAP Big 4 and non-Big 4 was carried out after 
the Enron scandal, showing that the big four auditors in KAP become more cautious in 
carrying out audit services (e.g., Fargher et al., 2001). This is done to restore the 
reputation of KAP big four after Andersen destroyed this reputation in the Enron 
scandal. Lu (2006) found that the replacement does not degrade the auditor 
independence and audit quality in the period after the Enron scandal emerged. Rama 
and Read (2006) also found that the advent of SOX Acts 2002 lead auditor 
increasingly cautious in providing services, especially when he got the first task after 
replacing the old auditor. 
The results of the above studies show that after the audit scandals revealed, the 
perceptions of risks to be borne out when the auditor was wrong in giving an opinion,  
were greater. When audited was convicted of fraud and the auditors did not know it, 
for the auditor, in addition to the sanctions that will be accepted, his reputation would 
be ruined. The higher the risk of sanctions resulted in the firm being cautious in 
conducting audits. 
Implementation of the law enforcement is set to be influential in determining the 
level of risk of sanctions for violations of those rules. If the auditor ever violated and 
got punished, or a lot of people see those who break the rules and got punished, then 
auditors would be more careful in the work. As quoted by Jones et al. (2003), studies 
by Douglas et al. (2001), Dreike and Moeckel (1995), Claypool et al. (1990) provide 
evidence that a person's behavior in an environment with a high threat of litigation 
would act more ethically than the behavior of people who are in an environment with a 
low threat of litigation. People who are in an environment with a high threat of 
litigation is more sensitive to ethical dilemmas that people who are in an environment 
with a low threat of litigation. The results of these studies indicate that the perception 
of the risks that may be encountered, can predispose a person to be more sensitive to 
the ethical dilemma and then they would be careful in acting, especially in actions that 
may be a risk to his career and reputation. This means the regulations made will have 
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an impact on the behavior of a person if he has confidence that if he violates, it will be 
likely that he gets sanctioned. Conversely, if he has confidence that if he violates but 
getting sanctioned, then he is likely to violate. 
The social cognitive theory explains that self-experience and others' experience 
will affect the cognitive formed. Cognitive is used to form the self-regulation and self-
regulation will further establish self-efficacy. Self-efficacy will be used as a guide and 
tool control in action. The success obtained either by oneself or others will strengthen 
self-efficacy and failure will weaken self-efficacy. Failure to resolve ethical dilemmas 
in the past will result in a person to avoid the same problem in the future, and if he had 
to face the same problem, then he should avoid settlement in which, the past failed. 
Auditor's professional sanction future concerns results in the avoidance of these 
problems. 
Clarkson et al. (2002) found that cognitive bias can be reduced if one can sense 
that as a result of the actions taken can have negative effects on themselves. Grant et 
al. (1996), by conducting experimental research, finding that the regulations made by 
professional organizations have an essential role in improving audit quality and is 
increasingly becoming a more significant role when there are effective sanctions 
mechanism. Anggraini et al. (2013) research results, showed that the auditor’s 
professionalism, influence his independence against the audited. Professionalism is the 
result of a process of cognitive development experienced by auditors in a particular 
work environment. The same is professional sanctioned concerns. The higher 
professional sanction concerns from professional organizations will also cause the 
auditor to be more careful in doing the job. This means that the higher the auditor's 
concerns will be sanctioned professionally, then he will be more independent of the 
audited. Therefore, the hypothesis is: 
H2. Professional auditor sanction concerns give a positive effect on the independence 
of the audited. 
Results of research Anggraini et al. (2013) showed that employment context 
affects professionalism and auditor's independence. However, the context does not 




moderate the relationship between work professionalism and independence. I suspect 
that professional sanction concerns and professionalism are mutually reinforcing to 
increase the independence of auditors. The higher the professional sanction concerns 
and the higher professionalism of the auditor, the more capable the auditor to face 
ethical dilemmas when acting independently towards the audited. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is: 
 
H3. The positive influence on the professionalism of auditor independence will be 
stronger when the professional sanction concerns are higher. 
3. Research Methods 
3.1 Subject Research 
The research subjects (participants) in this study is the auditor who works in the 
big 4 and non-big 4 KAP. The sampling method used was purposive sampling because 
KAP attended based on the address can be found by investigators. Questionnaires 
were administered to the auditor with the position of junior partner to the auditor at 
KAPs in Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, Denpasar, and Yogyakarta.  
 
1.  Methods for Data Collection 
This research was conducted in 2010-2011 with a survey method based 
scenarios. In the scenario, participants (in this case the auditor) faced with the 
problem to follow the wishes of their clients, simultaneously; he was faced 
with the rules governing the work and if it does not comply will be sanctioned 
by the freezing of license to practice. The subject is asked to act as if they are 
a partner in an accounting firm and had to decide to meet the wishes of 
audited or not. 
By using the auditor subject, research on decision making by professionals will be 
closer to the actual conditions in practice so that study is expected to capture the 
behavior of professionals in addressing the real ethical dilemmas. This is due to 
decisions taken by the professional will tend to be based on their experiences during 
the auditing. 
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The scenario used is a case that shows the differences between the auditor and the 
audited assessment of the reserve estimation has obsolete inventory. The internal 
auditor has approved the estimates made by the company because they assume that the 
estimates made are not significantly different from the estimates made in the past year. 
 
2. Operational Definition of Variables Research  
a. The level of independence (INDPi)  
Measurement of this variable is the same as that of the Anggraini et 
al. (2013) is by using instruments made by Rahim (1983), known as 
ROCI-II (The Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory-II) with 
minor modifications to suit the given scenario. This study only uses 
the items to measure the types of strategies to dominate the course 
(i.e., item numbers 10, 11, 24, 27) for the auditor's independence more 
related to the selection of strategies dominate. Scores of 
independences measure the total value score of four questions. Total 
score of independence is after this referred ROCI-II scores dominate 
strategy. 
b. Work context (BIG4) 
As performed by Anggraini et al. (2013), work context dummy 
variables measure where a subject worked. Subjects will be assigned 
a value of 0 if he works at KAP non-big four and if he works at KAP 
big four given numbers 1. 
c. Professional sanction concerns (SPi) 
This variable was measured by using the following two questions:  
1) Government rule in the form of freezing permits for the practice of 
public accounting will be considered in the audit process that I do.2) 
Because it is based on previous experience, a lot of the Firm or Public 
Accountant license suspended its audit practice, and then I would be 
cautious in giving an opinion. 




Professional sanction concerns score, measure the total score of the 
two questions. Total professionalism score is named after scores of 
professional sanctions. 
d. Professionalism (PROFSi) 
As performed by Anggraini et al. (2013), professionalism auditor 
measured using the measurement as used by Liu et al. (2003). They 
use the measurement requirements of the professional role of Miner 
(1993). Four dimensions make up professionalism: (1) improving the 
knowledge, (2) to act independently, (3) recognizes the status, (4) 
willing to help, and (5) demonstrate a professional commitment. 
Professionalism scores measured by the total score of 21 questions. 
Total professionalism score is called after Miner score.  
e. Control variable 
As performed by Anggraini et al. (2013), this study included three 
control variables, namely:  
1) Auditor’s Position (Jabi) Subjects were divided into four levels 
starting from a partner, manager, senior auditors, and junior auditors. 
Assessment is based on ranking positions. Partners who occupy the 
highest positions rated four until the junior auditor lowest positions 
rated 1. 
2) Gender (GNDi) 
This study measures the gender variable by giving a value of 1 in 
women and 0 on the male subjects. 3) Experience (PGLM1i, 
PGLM2i, and Umi) 
Experience is measured in three ways. Namely, the length of 
respondents worked in KAP (PGLM1i) and the length of respondents’ 
work as an auditor (PGLM2i). 
4) Context Working (Bigi) 
The employment context is dummy variables if auditors working in 
KAP big four are numbered 1, while if it is not assigned a value of 0.  
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3.2 Research Model and Testing Method 
The research model and its testing method are as follows: 
Hypothesis testing is one done with different Independent test samples (Independent 
Sample Test) 
Hypothesis 4 is supported if the average SPi, BIG 4 <average SPi, NON-BIG 4. 
Information: 
SPi, BIG 4 = Auditors’ professional sanction fears of working in 
KAP big 4 
SPi, NON-BIG 4 = Auditors’ professional sanction fears of working inKAP non-big 
four 
 
a. Testing hypotheses 2 and 3 performed with Multiple Regression Analysis 
Model testing: 
 
INDPi = β0+β1SPi+ β4PROFSi* SPi + Control Variable +εi 
Keterangan: 
INDPi = Auditor Independence Level i  
PROFSi = Auditor Professionalism Level i 
SPi = Professional sanction fears level 
 
Control Variabel include: 
JABi = Auditor’s position 
GNDi = Gender 
PGLM1i = Experience in KAP now 
PGLM2i = Experience as an auditor 









4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This research uses respondent auditors working in KAP Big 4, and non-big four 
are located in Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, Yogyakarta, and Denpasar. Especially for 
auditors working in KAP big four only taken two big four accounting firm in Jakarta. 
Distribution of questionnaires began from January 2010 to July 2011. Questionnaires 
were distributed as many as 350 pieces and questionnaires were returned and 
completed in full, a total of 207 pieces. This shows response rates were high at 
59.14%. The questionnaire comprises a total of 207 pieces of 95 respondents from 
non-big four accounting firm and 112 respondents from big 4 KAP. Descriptive 
statistics for each of the variables tested are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistic 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 













7,99 8,29 3,00 2,00 10,00 10,00 1,50 1,38 
Independence  
(INDPi) 
14,00 15,58 7,00 10,00 20,00 20,00 3,04 2,17 
Professionalism 
(PROFSi) 
85,09 90,01 58,00 75,00 106,00 108,00 8,33 6,50 
         
 
4.2 Hypothesis Testing Results 
Results of testing hypothesis 1 are presented in Table 2 
 Table 2  
The result of Hypothesis Testing with-Independent Sample Test 
Variable Group Mean t-test (Sign) 
SPi 
BIG 4 7,990 
-1,408 (0,161) 
NON-BIG 4 8,289 





Table 2 shows that hypothesis 1 is not supported, it appears that there are no 
differences in average significant score of professional sanctions between auditors 
working in KAP big 4 and auditors working in KAP non big four, although the value 
of the average score of sanctions professionals on auditors working in KAP big 4 
auditors are lower than in non big KAP 4. This means that the level of concern of 
getting professional sanctions from big 4 auditors at KAP is lower than non-big four 
accounting firm, but the differences were not significant. 
 
4.3 Hypothesis 2 and 3 
Results of testing hypotheses 2 and 3 are presented in Table 3 
 Table 3 
Results of testing hypotheses 2 and 3Uji Regresi Berganda 
 
  Coefficient score Uji t (Sig.) Adjusted R2  F-test 
 
Model 1 without SPi  dan PROFSi interaction  
1 SPi 0,408** 3,312 (0,001) 0,26 22,644 (0,000) 
2 PROFSi 0,143** 6,281 (0,000) 
3 GENDERi -0,137* -2,145 (0,033) 
 
Model 2 with SPi  dan PROFSi interaction 
1 SPi 3,111** 2,584 (0,011) 0,276 18,638 (0,000) 
2 PROFSi 0,385** 3,520 (0,001) 
3 SPi* PROFSi -0,030* -2,257 (0,25) 
4 GENDERi -0,131* -2,068 (0,040) 
 
Table 3 shows the results of multiple regression tests with two test models. The 
first model was used to compare with the second model to determine the moderating 
effects of variables concerns professional sanctions (SPi) on the relationship between 
professionalism (PROFSi) and independence (INDPi). SPi variables influence the test 
results and PROFSi individually against INDPi variable indicates that SPi and 
PROFSi variables significantly influence INDPi variables with a significance level 
below 1%. This suggests that the second hypothesis is supported. In other words, the 




professional sanction concerns affect the auditor's independence. These test results 
support the social cognitive theory that the legal environment affects the formation of 
cognitive auditors indicated by the perception of the risk of getting professional 
sanctions. The higher the risk of getting sanction professionally, auditor increasingly 
aware will be sanctioned professionally so he will be cautious in giving an audit 
opinion or become more independent. 
Table 3 shows that the adjusted R2 for the model without interaction is smaller 
than the model with interaction. This means that the variable interactions SPi * 
PROFSi an explanatory factor for INDPi. In other words, professional concerns 
sanctioned moderate the relationship between professionalism and auditor 
independence. However, the third hypothesis is not supported for interaction variables 
SPi * PROFSi coefficient is negative, which means that the variable SPi weaken the 
relationship PROFSi and INDPi. This means, when fear of professional sanctions 
became higher, it lessens the relationship between professionalism and auditor 
independence. Professional sanction concern is a factor that is a substitute for 
professionalism. When the auditor's professionalism is low but has high professional 
sanction concerns, the auditor can still act independently. The test results of the 
interaction effect SPi * PROFSi provides evidence that when the auditor is not or less 
professional but being in an environment that is perceived by the auditor to have a 
high risk of getting penalized, the auditor did not dare to take action that threatens its 
independence. 
 
5. Conclusions, Implications and Limitations 
This study suggests that first, professional sanction concerns are not affected by 
the auditor's workplace. Although professional sanction concerns from big 4 auditors 
at KAP is lower than the auditor at KAP non-big four, the difference found was not 
significant. Second, professional sanction concerns and professionalism, has 
substitution characteristic, in influencing the independence of auditors. In other words, 
when one factor is low, then the auditor's independence can still be maintained. If the 
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auditor does not behave professionally but has high professional sanction concerns, 
then he will keep its independence for fear of professional sanctions. 
The implication of this study is the importance of law enforcement in improving 
the performance of auditors. Auditor with the big four and non-big four proven 
equally have professional sanction concerns and the higher professional sanction 
concerns, the higher the auditor's independence. If the rules are implemented 
effectively on both auditors with a high level of professionalism, medium or low 
professionalism auditors would be afraid to meet the wishes of clients (audited) that 
could threaten its independence. The results provide an essential contribution to both 
government regulators and the Committee for Public Accounting Profession to be 
serious in enforcing the rules that have been created.  
Although the results of this study provide important policy implications, the 
results of this study cannot be separated from the weaknesses. First, the use of 
scenario-based survey methods has many drawbacks, especially regarding internal 
validity because researchers can not strictly control the process of filling out the 
questionnaire given to the subject. Second, the amount of data obtained from this 
study is not in proportion between different position level, because most of the 
questionnaires filled out by the junior and senior auditor. This is unavoidable because 
of the number of junior and senior auditors at each KAP are far more than the manager 
and partner. Also, to get a response from the partner or manager to be interested in 
filling the questionnaire is also very difficult because they do not have much free time 
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